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IF WE COULD INSTIL SOCIAL JUSTICE 
VALUES THROUGH CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, 
SHOULD WE?
Paul McKeown* and Elaine Hall**
Abstract: Universities are more than just institutions for the transfer of 
knowledge; they are institutions where students learn about the world and how 
it works, and in clinical legal education, there is a long and persistent tradition 
of seeing the formation of “social justice” clinicians as a principal educational 
goal. This article covers three areas: we ask “Why do we believe values are 
formed in clinic?” and in Section II “Do values change at university and if so, 
how?”, examining what evidence there is for a suffi cient degree of plasticity 
in undergraduate populations so that values might change over a module or a 
year and what evidence there is that changes to values at university (if any) 
persist into later life. Section III takes a broader philosophical position in 
relation to legal education and the ethical imperatives of the teacher, asking 
“if we can make students believe something, is this a good thing?”
Keywords: clinical legal education; values and virtue education; personal 
and psychological development; evidence-based pedagogy; ethical and 
educational duties
Universities are more than just institutions for the transfer of knowledge; they are 
institutions where students learn about the world and how it works. Within the 
discipline of law, the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) states 
that students graduating from an undergraduate degree should be “aware of the 
consequences of the law as a human creation and that it is subject to the ethics and 
values of those that make and apply it”,1 and in clinical legal education, there is a 
long and persistent tradition (exemplifi ed most recently in the study by Nicholson2) 
of seeing the formation of “social justice” clinicians as a principal educational goal. 
This article covers three areas: we ask “why do we believe values are formed in 
clinic?” through a geographical/historical analysis of the culture of clinical legal 
education in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Europe, Africa and 
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Kingdom.
1 Quality Assurance Agency, “Subject Benchmark Statement: Law (2015)” (The Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education, July 2015) 6, available at www.qaa.ac.uk/publications/information-and-guidance/
publication?PubID=2966#.WsYstkxFw2w (visited 20 March 2018).
2 Donald Nicholson, “Our Roots Began in (South) Africa: Modeling Law Clinics to Maximize Social 
Justice Ends” (2016) 23(3) Int’l J Clinical Legal Educ 87.
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Asia, noting in particular the elements that have transcended context and those 
which have been particularly shaped by local circumstances. Section II explores the 
question “do values change at university and if so, how?” using the latest research 
from neuroscience and education to assess how we currently understand the 
development of personal and professional values. In particular, what evidence there 
is for a suffi cient degree of plasticity in undergraduate populations so that values 
might change over a module or a year and what evidence there is that changes 
to values at university (if any) persist into later life? Section III takes a broader 
philosophical position in relation to legal education and the ethical imperatives 
of the teacher, asking “if we can make students believe something, is this a good 
thing?”. Taking the position that our role is primarily to develop students’ ability to 
think rather than telling them what to think in order to “develop their own refl ective 
system of justice”,3 we problematise the transmission of values through direct 
pedagogy, modelling and the unconscious curriculum.
I. Why Do We Believe Values Are Formed in Clinic?
In understanding why we believe values are formulated in clinic, it is important to 
consider the history of the clinical legal education movement from its inception to 
its gradual spread across the globe.
Scholars have spilt much ink setting out the history of clinical legal education.4 
We can trace the genesis of the clinical legal education movement to Jerome 
Frank’s seminal paper, “Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?”.5 In his critique of 
legal education in American law schools, Frank posited that law schools should 
“get in intimate contact with what clients need and with what courts and lawyers 
actually do”.6 Of particular note is that Frank’s conceptualisation for a legal clinic:
“would not confi ne their activities to such as are now undertaken by the 
Legal Aid Society. They could take on important work for governmental 
3 David Barnhizer, “The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education” (1990) 35(1) N Y L Sch L Rev 87, 
112.
4 See generally Frank S Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social Justice 
(Oxford: OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011); Stephen Wizner, “Is Social Justice Still Relevant” 
(2012) 32(2) BC J L & Soc Just 345, 356; Bruce Lasky and Shuvro Prosun Saker, “Introduction: Clinical 
Legal Education and Its Asian Characteristics” in Shuvro Prosun Saker (ed), Clinical Legal Education and 
Asia: Accessing Justice for the Underprivileged (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Stephen Wizner, 
“Beyond Skills Training” (2001) 7 Clinical L Rev 327, 340; Margaret Martin Barry et al, “Clinical Education 
for This Millennium: The Third Wave” (2000) 7(1) Clinical L Rev 1, 76; Jon Dubin, “Clinical Design for 
Social Justice Imperatives” (1998) 51 SMU L Rev 1461; Phillip Schrag and Michael Meltsner, “Refl ections 
on Clinical Legal Education” (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998); George Grossman, “Clinical 
Legal Education: History and Diagnosis” (1973) 26(2) Journal of Legal Education 162.
5 Jerome Frank, “Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?” (1933) 81(8) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 907.
6 Ibid., p.913.
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agencies or other quasi-public bodies. The professional work they would 
do would include virtually every kind of service rendered by law offi ces.”7
The clinical legal education movement boom began during the mid-20th century 
in the United States.8 This was an era of social upheaval including the civil rights 
movement, women’s rights and the Vietnam War. There were also issues around 
poverty with governmental measures for the “provision of legal services for both 
civil and criminal legal problems of those unable to afford legal counsel”.9 With the 
increased demand for legal services:
“[i]t became a standard motto of the times that professional responsibility 
applies not only to the ethics involving the individual attorney’s relationship 
with his client, but also to the responsibility of the profession as a whole to 
see to it that legal services are made available to all segments of society.”10
At this time, the Ford Foundation “became interested advancing the cause of 
practical law training for the sake of professional responsibility”.11 With this in 
mind, the Ford Foundation established and funded the Council on Legal Education 
and Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) in 1967, which would be the “leading 
force behind the widespread movement toward clinical legal education”.12 Nearly 
half of the existing law schools in the United States received funding from CLEPR 
to establish clinical programmes.13 Other law schools, inspired by the success of 
CLEPR funded programmes, started their own.14
The MacCrate Report, published in 1992, supported the use of clinical 
legal education as a methodology for teaching legal skills and professional 
responsibility.15 In response to the MacCrate Report, the American Bar Association 
amended its accreditation standards in 1996 requiring all accredited law schools 
to offer live-client or other real-life practice experiences.16 This rule persists, and 
all accredited law schools are required to “provide substantial opportunities to 
 7 Ibid., p.918.
 8 Jeff Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” in Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social 
Justice (Oxford: OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011); see Grossman, “Clinical Legal 
Education: History and Diagnosis” (n.4).
 9 See Grossman, “Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis” (n.4) p.173.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p.172.
12 Ibid., p.173.
13 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8).
14 See Schrag and Meltsner, “Refl ections on Clinical Legal Education” (n.4).
15 American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and 
Professional Development — An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and 
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (MacCrate Report) (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 1992) pp.234–235.
16 Peter Joy, “The Cost of Clinical Legal Education” (2012) 32(2) BC J L & Soc Just 309, 325.
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students for: (1) law clinics or fi eld placement(s); and (2) student participation in 
pro bono legal services, including law-related public service activities”.17
The notion of public service and professional responsibility are embedded 
within the origins and development of clinical legal education in the United States. 
However, the clinical movement in the United Kingdom was somewhat different.
The clinical movement in the United Kingdom started in the 1970s. The 
University of Kent was the fi rst to establish a clinic incorporated into the curriculum 
in 1973. This was followed by the establishment of other clinical programmes 
including the Warwick Legal Practice Programme with the main objective of 
providing “a special form of legal education to law students”.18 By the mid-1990s, 
eight universities reported running a live-client clinical programme.19 Only two 
of these programmes offered a full representation service to clients, while other 
programmes limited their work to advice or representation before the county 
court or tribunal.20 It is worth noting that six of the universities that offered a live-
client clinical programme were “new universities”.21 A review of legal education 
and the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct 
(ACLEC) Report conducted during this period, published in 1996, supported the 
use of clinical methods to integrate theory and practice.22 Since this period, clinical 
legal education has seen continued growth in the United Kingdom with at least 70 
per cent of law schools offering pro bono opportunities to students.23
Since the early days of clinical activity in the United Kingdom, the educational 
value of clinical legal education has been the primary driving force behind the 
movement although there have be some advocates, such as Donald Nicholson, 
for putting the social justice mission at the forefront of the clinical movement.24 
17 American Bar Association, ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016–
17 (ABA, 2016) Standard 303, available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/2016_2017_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure.authcheckdam.pdf 
(visited 10 March 2018).
18 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8).
19 Richard Grimes et al, “Legal Skills and Clinical Legal Education — A Survey of Undergraduate Law 
School Practice” (1996) 30(1) Law Teacher 44, 64.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, First Report on Legal Education 
and Training (HMSO, 1996).
23 Damien Carney et al, “The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014” (LawWorks, 
2014) 10, available at www.lawworks.org.uk/sites/default/fi les/LawWorks-student-pro-bono-report%20
2014.pdf (visited 10 March 2018); clinical legal education and pro bono are widely regarded as different 
concepts. However, the report defi ned “pro bono” as “an activity organised and/or delivered by a 
law school that provides a legal service to an individual, group or organisation without charge”, thus 
encompassing clinical activities.
24 See Nicholson, “Our Roots Began in (South) Africa: Modeling Law Clinics to Maximize Social Justice 
Ends” (n.2); Donald Nicholson, “Calling, Character and Clinical Legal Education: A Cradle to Grave 
Approach to Inculcating a Love for Justice” (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 36; Donald Nicolson, “Education, 
Education, Education: Legal, Moral and Clinical” (2008) 42(2) Law Tchr 145; Donald Nicholson, “Legal 
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The LawWorks Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014 cited “educational value” as 
the most important reason for respondents to undertake pro bono activities and 
“social justice” as the second most important reason.25 It is likely that the reason the 
United Kingdom has pursued clinical activities primarily for educational reasons 
rather than social justice reasons is the historical availability of legal aid. Under the 
Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949, legal aid was available to everyone of “small and 
moderate means” and “in all courts and tribunals where lawyers normally appears 
for private clients”.26 In the 1970s, the Green Form scheme facilitated the provision 
of advice and assistance “on any matter of English law on the basis of a simplifi ed 
test of income and expenditure”.27 From 1979 and throughout the early 1980s, 79 
per cent of the population were eligible for legal aid.28
Unfortunately, and largely as a consequence of cost to the public purse, cuts 
were made in terms of eligibility which meant that the percentage of households 
eligible for civil legal aid fell from 77 per cent in 1979–1980 to 47 per cent in 
1994–1995.29 The availability of legal aid was further eroded as Sch.2 of the Access 
to Justice Act 1999 removed a number of areas from the scope of civil legal aid.30 
This meant that even those who were fi nancially eligible could not receive public 
funding if their case was out of scope. By 2007, the percentage of the population 
eligible for civil legal aid had fallen to 29 per cent. Throughout this period, the 
number of private practice solicitors engaged in legal aid work was falling with 
the not-for-profi t sector providing an increased proportion of legal help in social 
welfare law.31 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(LASPO), often heralded as the death knell of legal aid, saw vast areas of law 
removed from the scope of legal aid with only those areas listed in Sch.1 of the Act 
falling within scope.
While the last 30 years has seen an erosion of legal aid, the poorest were 
still eligible to receive assistance. Therefore, the use of clinical legal education 
as a vehicle to provide legal assistance to the poor was not a signifi cant factor in 
its development in the United Kingdom. It was not until the implementation of 
LASPO in April 2013 that the number of individuals unable to obtain advice and 
Education or Community Service? The Extra-Curricular Student Law Clinic” (2006) 3 Web Journal 
of Current Legal Issues, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/2006/issue3/
nicolson3.html (visited 10 March 2018).
25 See Carney et al, “The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014” (n.23) p.39.
26 Sir Henry Brooke, “The History of Legal Aid 1945–2010” (Bach Commission on Access to Justice — 
Appendix 6, 2017), available at www.fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Bach-Commission-
Appendix-6-F-1.pdf (visited 10 March 2018).
27 Ibid., p.8.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p.11.
30 For example, personal injury other than clinical negligence, conveyancing, wills and defamation.
31 See Brooke, “The History of Legal Aid 1945–2010” (n.26) p.23.
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assistance became a signifi cant issue.32 This has seen some calls to utilise clinical 
legal education to fi ll the access to justice gap.33
In Australia, the clinical movement can be traced back to the establishment of 
clinical programmes at Monash University, La Trobe University and the University 
of New South Wales by “young academics and socially active students” in the mid-
1970s and early 1980s.34 Following reforms to the university sector in Australia, the 
number of law schools expanded and clinic was seen as a way for new law schools 
to differentiate themselves in an increasingly competitive market.35 The Australian 
clinics have benefi ted from key members of academic staff remaining involved 
with their programmes for more than 20 years.36 People with a strong commitment 
to access to justice issues staff the clinics, bringing an emphasis on community 
service and using the law and legal system to achieve community development 
objectives.
In Africa, law clinics were established for two purposes: “to provide legal 
services and access to justice, and to teach law students practical skills”.37 Live-
client clinics are the accepted norm in Africa with universities “surrounded by 
seas of poverty and often the services provided by national legal aid schemes 
are minimal”.38 The fi rst clinical programme established in South Africa was in 
1972 by law students from the University of Cape Town.39 This programme was 
managed entirely by students, under supervision by external legal practitioners, 
32 While it is accepted that the number of litigants in person have increased, it is diffi cult, if not 
impossible, to fi nd reliable data regarding the number of individuals impacted by the reduction in legal 
aid. For example, there are no available data regarding the number of individuals who choose not to 
pursue a matter because they cannot fi nd legal assistance. Further, civil courts and tribunals do not 
collate records on the number of litigants represented. However, the National Audit Offi ce reported 
that the number of family cases in which neither party was represented had increased by 30 per cent. 
See, House of Commons Justice Committee, Impact of Changes to Civil Legal Aid under Part 1 of the 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: Eighth Report of Session 2014–15 (HC 
311, 2015) p.36.
33 Civil Justice Council, Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-represented Litigants): A Report 
and Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor and to the Lord Chief Justice (2011) p.55. Victoria 
Murray, “The Rise and Fall of Social Justice within Clinical Legal Education” in Chris Ashford and Paul 
McKeown (eds), Social Justice and Legal Education (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2018).
34 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8); see also Jeff Giddings, “Clinical Legal Education in Australia: A Historical 
Perspective” (2003) 3 Int’l J Clinical Legal Educ 7.
35 See Giddings et al, “The First Wave of Modern Clinical Legal Education: The United States, Britain, 
Canada and Australia” (n.8).
36 Ibid.
37 David McQuoid-Mason et al, “Clinical Legal Education in Africa: Legal Education and Community 
Service” in Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: Educating Lawyers for Social Justice (Oxford: 
OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.; see also Peggy Maisel, “Expanding and Sustaining Clinical Legal Education in Developing 
Countries: What We Can Learn from South Africa” (2007) 30(2) Fordham Int’l LJ 374.
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without support from the faculty.40 In 1973, the Ford Foundation funded a legal 
aid conference in South Africa resulting in the establishment of fi ve clinical 
programmes within two years. The clinical movement developed in South Africa 
throughout the apartheid era. The liberal universities primarily tried to assist the 
victims of apartheid, while those universities that supported the apartheid regime 
focused on practical skills.41 Throughout the 1980s, the clinical movement spread 
throughout southern Africa to countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana. It has 
continued to progress and includes clinics in many countries throughout the region. 
Often referred to as “legal aid clinics”, the service element rather than the learning 
and teaching aspect is emphasised.42
In East Africa, there were a number of clinics established in the early 1970s such 
as the clinic at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam in Tanzania.43 Other clinics, such as 
the one at University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Makerere University, Uganda, 
were set up but did not survive the political turmoil of the time.44 Throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, law clinics have been established in countries such as Kenya, 
Rwanda and Somaliland.45 The law clinics were established “principally to bridge 
the gap between imparting practical legal skills and theory”.46 The clinics also 
responded to a “growing need for basic legal advice by indigent populations”.47
The clinical movement in West Africa has developed differently, partly due to 
the differences between anglophone and francophone countries. While there were 
some early initiatives in Nigeria during the 1980s, the clinical movement really 
began following the First All-Africa Colloquium on Clinical Legal Education 
in 2003, the establishment of the Network of University Legal Aid Institutions 
(NULAI) in 2003 and the fi rst Nigerian Clinical Legal Education Colloquium in 
2004.48 Financial support was received from international agencies including the 
Open Society Institute and the MacArthur Foundation.49 The law teachers who 
founded NULAI recognised:
“that law degree programmes and teaching methods in Nigerian Universities 
are not adapted to participatory and interactive learning and teaching; and 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.; further, for a history of clinical legal education in Nigeria, see generally Gbenga Oke-Samuel, 
“Clinical Legal Education in Nigeria — Developments and Challenges” (2008) 17(1) Griffi th L Rev 139; 
Ndubuisi Madubuike-Ekwe, “Challenges and Prospects of Legal Education in Nigeria: An Overview” 
(2017) 8(1) Nnamdi Azikiwe U J Int’l L & Juris 128.
49 Ibid.
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that the law curriculum is not skills focused and lacks opportunity for 
community service and the development of the mentality in using law for 
social change and development.”50
In francophone Africa, law clinics were run in partnership with NGOs and law 
students. In Morocco, a Human Rights Clinic Programme was established in 
partnership with the Law Faculty of Mohammedia at the University of Hassan II 
by the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in 2005.
In Asia, the development of clinical legal education has been described 
as “amorphous”.51 The reason has been attributed to the fact that it is a “broad 
continent with many nationalities, religions, ethnicities, languages and cultures” 
and the same can be said of the legal systems:
“which possess a mixture of common law, civil law, Shari’ah law, and 
customary law structures, often with a number of these structures existing 
within a single nation state. These legal systems have a multitude of roots 
and origins, with some dating back centuries and others having a more 
recent strong colonialist infl uence.”52
While legal education in Asia is also as “multifaceted” as the various legal systems, 
there are also common attributes.53 One of the primary issues common around 
Asia is that students are often “passive learners”, while teachers are seen as the 
“gurus imparting knowledge”.54 Clinical legal education challenges this attitude as 
the clinical teacher is “not the ‘sage on the stage’ but the ‘guide and the side’”.55 
Further, lawyering skills, professional ethics and societal responsibilities are not 
generally taught at the undergraduate level.56 While clinical legal education is 
seen as addressing these issues within Asian legal education, Lasky and Sarker 
highlighted that:
“one contemporary core commonality of most of these Asian CLE 
programs can be found in their focused social justice mission of delivering 
legal assistance and empowerment to the poor and marginalized, while 
simultaneously developing legal knowledge, skills, ethics, and pro bono 
values within the participating university students.”57 (emphasis added)
50 Ibid.
51 See Lasky and Sarker, “Introduction: Clinical Legal Education and Its Asian Characteristics” (n.4) p.5.
52 Ibid., p.6.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Richard Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal 
Education” (2009) 10 German LJ 823, 829.
56 See Lasky and Sarker, “Introduction: Clinical Legal Education and Its Asian Characteristics” (n.4) p.6.
57 Ibid.
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Throughout Southeast Asia, the development of clinical programmes has often 
been in conjunction with organisations external to the university. Organisations, such 
as the United Nations, through their Development Programme,58 the Open Society 
Justice Initiative59 and Bridges Across Borders South East Asia Community Legal 
Education Initiative,60 as well as a number of other non-governmental organisations 
have worked with universities and assisted indigent groups.61
In India, early clinical programmes were inspired by two infl uential reports 
published in the 1970s aiming to integrate legal education with attempts to encourage 
the legal profession to contribute to social change.62 Both reports highlighted that 
clinical legal education would provide skills training while benefi ting the poor.63 In 
1981, the Committee for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes concluded that “court 
or litigation-oriented legal aid programs could not alone provide social justice in 
India” and recommended the establishment of legal aid clinics in law schools to 
motivate student to provide legal aid to the poor.64 In 1997, the Bar Council of India 
issued a circular directing all universities and law colleges to incorporate clinical 
type programmes into their three- and fi ve-year law curricula.65 Interestingly, 
the type of activities which satisfi ed the circular included “moot court; student 
chambering; attendance, observation, and refl ection of both civil and criminal 
trials; drafting pleadings and conveyances; professional ethics; and training in 
legal aid”.66 It appears that these activities are predominantly for the educational 
benefi t of the student, particularly in relation to skills and legal practice, rather than 
providing any benefi t to the poor.
In Continental Europe, the clinical movement fl ourished in the former 
Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe.67 Throughout the Communist-
era, members of the legal profession lacked ability and competence and/or were 
reluctant to engage in rule of law, human rights and public interest lawyering. 
This mentality persisted after the fall of Communism. It is against this backdrop 
that an ambitious agenda for law reform was set in motion throughout the 1990s 
58 For further information, see www.undp.org/.
59 For further information, see www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/open-society-justice-
initiative.
60 For further information, see www.babseacle.org/.
61 See generally Bruce Lasky and MRK Prasad, “The Clinical Movement in Southeast Asia and India: A 
Comparative Perspective and Lessons to be Learned” in Bloch (ed), The Global Clinical Movement: 
Educating Lawyers for Social Justice (Oxford: OUP, Oxford Scholarship Online Edition, 2011).
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 See generally Dubravka Aksamovic and Phillip Genty, “An Examination of the Challenges, Successes and 
Setbacks for Clinical Legal Education in Eastern Europe” (2014) 20(1) Int’l J Clinical Legal Educ 427; 
Martin Tomoszek, “Legal Clinics and Social Justice in Post-Communist Countries” in Chris Ashford and 
Paul McKeown (eds), Social Justice and Legal Education (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 
2018).
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including reform of legal institutions, legislation and the need to educate and 
empower a new generation of legal professionals. A fundamental problem existed 
in that universities saw themselves as identifying and defi ning concepts of law 
rather than analysing and solving legal problems. As a consequence, various 
international donor initiatives were launched to train judges and lawyers on issues 
related to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. One initiative started in 
1996 related to the promotion of human rights and the operation of university 
legal clinics. Students were “trained in legal skills and values” and would provide 
free legal assistance. The initiative received fi nancial support from a number of 
organisations including the American Bar Association’s Central European and 
Eurasian Law Initiative, the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Institute and 
Soros Foundations Network. Between 1997 and 2002, more than 75 university 
law clinics were established in more than 20 countries. The clinics usually 
focused on “both skills and values training” while working with vulnerable and 
indigent groups.
Western Europe has long been regarded as the last bastion resisting the clinical 
movement.68 Wilson identifi es fi ve critiques of clinical legal education that have 
been addressed in other parts of the world, but have arguably stifl ed development 
in Europe, namely, the existence of pre-existing apprenticeships before entry into 
the legal profession; the large size of undergraduate classes; a threat to the legal 
profession losing paying clients; the number of small law fi rms; and the utilisation 
of clinics to fi ll the legal services gaps for the poor.69
Wilson also identifi es “traditions” within the civil law system that perhaps 
hindered the development of clinical legal education. First, the “conception of law” 
is different between civil and common law jurisdictions. Civil law systems see the 
law as “a series of fundamental principles”, while in common law jurisdictions, 
the law is “a means of providing remedies for certain cases: remedies proceed 
rights”.70 Second, the nature and status of the professoriate are different in civil 
law jurisdictions. The professoriate “not only expresses the law but formulates 
it”.71 This echoes the academic/practitioner divide cited in the literature. Finally, 
Wilson highlights the high level of state control over legal education resulting in 
standardised programmes with little room for innovation.
However, despite the aforementioned challenges, clinical legal education has 
started to infi ltrate the Western European law school. One reason cited for the ingress 
of clinical activity is the Bologna Process seeking to harmonise education across 
the signatory countries, including all European Union member states. The Bologna 
Process requires a focus not only on technical knowledge but also the competencies 
68 The United Kingdom is the exception in Western Europe.
69 See Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education” 
(n.55).
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
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and skills required for a successful legal career and active participation in economy 
and society.72 The Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe has also produced 
a report identifying the skills and attributes of a successful lawyer. There is a focus 
on skills, ethics and values that cannot be taught in a classroom or a lecture theatre 
but instead are best learnt through clinical programmes.73 The Quality Assurance, 
Accreditation and Assessment Committee, a committee of the European Law 
Faculties Association, identifi ed four “competencies” for law students. One of 
these competencies includes “an understanding of core values associated with the 
law”.74 In 2013, the European Network for Clinical Legal Education (ENCLE) was 
established. ENCLE’s objectives include, inter alia, the pursuit and promotion 
of social justice values and diversity as core values of the legal profession and 
improvement to the quality of legal education.75
The clinical literature originates predominantly from the United States.76 In 
the early clinical literature, while it is noted that there were some educational 
benefi ts from participation in assisting to indigents, this was secondary 
to community service.77 Mkwebu highlighted the dangers of citation bias, 
attaching higher status to the literature from the United States at the expense 
of publications from elsewhere.78 Further, often the same group of authors are 
cited,79 for example, Stephen Wizner, Jane Aiken and Jon Dubin, each with a 
distinguished background of public service activities, are fi erce proponents of 
public service.80
There is little empirical evidence to support the transformational impact 
of clinical legal education on students’ public interest ethos.81 A number of 
quantitative studies have found no evidence that clinical experiences while in law 
school infl uenced a desire in students to conduct public service and/or pro bono in 
72 William Woodruff and Andreas Bucker, “The Bologna Process and German Legal Education: Developing 
Professional Competence through Clinical Experiences” (2008) 9 German LJ 575.
73 See Wilson, “Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education” 
(n.55).
74 Ibid.
75 ENCLE, “About ENCLE: What Are Our Goals?”, available at encle.org/about-encle/what-are-our-goals 
(visited 26 March 2018).
76 Tribe Mkwebu, “A Systematic Review of Literature on Clinical Legal Education: A Tool for Researchers 
in Responding to an Explosion of Clinical Scholarship” (2015) 22(3) International Journal of Clinical 
Legal Education 1, 22.
77 See Grossman, “Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis” (n.4) p.174.
78 See Mkwebu, “A Systematic Review of Literature on Clinical Legal Education: A Tool for Researchers 
in Responding to an Explosion of Clinical Scholarship” (n.76) p.28.
79 Ibid., p.31.
80 See Barry et al, “Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave” (n.4); Wizner, “Beyond Skills 
Training” (n.4); Stephen Wizner and Jane Aiken, “Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics 
in Enhancing Access to Justice” (2004) 73 Fordham L Rev 997; Wizner, “Is Social Justice Still Relevant” 
(n.4); Dubin, “Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives” (n.4); Jane Aiken, “The Clinical Mission 
of Justice Readiness” (2012) 32 BCJL & Soc Just 231.
81 See Schrag and Melstner, “Refl ections on Clinical Legal Education” (n.4).
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their future career.82 Other studies suggest an increased willingness to participate in 
public service and/or pro bono activity following graduation.83
Notions of social justice, public interest and service are perhaps more nuanced. 
While respondents in the studies highlighted above did not report an increased 
willingness to participate in public service and pro bono work, they did report 
improvement to their awareness of social and economic issues such as poverty.84 Thus, 
while clinical programmes may not create an army of “social justice warriors”, it may 
be inculcating an ability within students to think about and critically evaluate the law 
and its wider social context. Indeed, the MacCrate Report also noted the limitations on 
a law school’s ability to prepare students for life in practice. While a law school can:
“help students recognize ethical dilemmas and can provide the rudiments 
of training for resolving them … the exposure of students to these issues 
in law school clinical programs … is very limited compared to the variety 
and complexity of ethical dilemmas that students confront in practice.”85
The MacCrate Report states that practising lawyers “may be more signifi cant than 
law teachers” in teaching professional values.86
If we examine the development of clinical legal education, its origins and global 
spread, patterns begin to emerge. We see that clinical legal education has taken root 
in periods of social and political upheaval, for example, the civil rights movement, 
the fall of communism and apartheid. In the United Kingdom and Australia, clinical 
legal education was adopted during the period of educational reform with “new 
universities” adopting the method and thus differentiating themselves from the 
Establishment. We can hypothesise that this is due to the activist traditions of clinical 
legal education. Often, clinical programmes have been established with international 
sponsorship aimed at social and economic change. Clinical programmes are 
often expensive to run in comparison to traditional classroom teaching. Clinical 
programmes may therefore need to address the aims (and values) of sponsor 
organisations to attract the necessary funding. We must also remember that a basic 
82 See Deborah Rhode, “Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice” (2003) 53(3) Journal of Legal Education 
413; Robert Granfi eld, “Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact of 
Mandatory Pro Bono Programs” (2007) 54 Buffalo Law Review 1355; Paul McKeown, “Law Student 
Attitudes towards Pro Bono and Voluntary Work: The Experience at Northumbria University” (2015) 
22(1) International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 6.
83 See Sally Maresh, “The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on Decisions of Law Students to Practice 
Public Interest Law” in Jeremy Cooper and Louise Trubek (eds), Educating for Justice: Social Values and 
Legal Education (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1997); Deborah Schmedemann, “Priming for Pro Bono Publico: 
The Impact of the Law School on Pro Bono Participation in Practice” in Robert Granfi eld and Lynn 
Mather (eds), Private Lawyers and the Public Interest: The Evolving Role of Pro Bono in the Legal 
Profession (New York: OUP 2009); Bharat Malkani and Linden Thomas, “The Birmingham Pro Bono 
Group: A Case Study of Social Justice in Legal Education” in Chris Ashford and Paul McKeown (eds), 
Social Justice and Legal Education (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2018).
84 See works referred to in note 82.
85 See MacCrate Report (n.15) p.235.
86 Ibid., p.236.
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premise of clinical legal education is real-life experience. If clinical programmes are 
going to provide their students with a real-life experience, they need a source that 
experience. At the risk of sounding cynical, the poor and disadvantaged in society 
are a source of clients as they are unlikely to receive assistance elsewhere. Whether 
the educational mission or the social justice mission primarily motivates a clinical 
programme, it is likely that the poor and disadvantaged will provide the client base 
of the programme. As a consequence, an epistemic system belief has emerged in 
relation to the notion of social justice and public service, inextricably fusing the 
concepts within the very fabric of clinical legal education. So much so that for many, 
it has become a part of the defi nition of clinical legal education.
The purpose of this historical tour is to provide the narrative explanation for the 
widely held beliefs that social justice and clinic are inextricably intertwined, that to 
attempt to disentangle them is wrong and that the principal goals of clinical activity 
are the material benefi t to the community and the moral benefi t to the students. 
We would also like to explore the philosophical and psychological nature of these 
beliefs. Achinstein87 gave us a framework for understanding the different ways in 
which beliefs are formed, held and supported through different engagements with 
Hypothesis (H) and Evidence (E) (Table 1).88 This framework allows us to interrogate 
the basis for beliefs and assumptions and could be used hierarchically, privileging 
certain kinds of knowledge and evidence and dismissing others as lesser or fl awed,89 
but this would be a misunderstanding of the way in which human beings deal with 
complexity.90 Epistemic system and subjective evidence necessarily form large parts 
of our reality, as it is simply not practical to interrogate everything in daily life with 
the rigour needed to produce potential, much less veridical evidence.
We introduce this framework as a background to the discussion that follows, as 
a prompt for writers and readers to ask “Why do I think this? How do I know?”. 
For example, the historical overview above suggests the hypothesis that the United 
Kingdom has the most “educationally-driven” model of clinic and that educational 
goals are rated above social justice goals91 although social justice remains a close 
second. The different kinds of evidence for this hypothesis are often woven together in 
the discourse, with culturally specifi c explanations merged with the data from empirical 
studies. This is not to say that these different kinds of evidence cannot or should not 
87 Peter Achinstein, The Book of Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
88 This table is a summary of Kvernbekk’s 2011 discussion of Achinstein developed by Elaine Hall for the 
Association of Law Teachers 2016 conference keynote: “The Use of Evidence in Writing about Legal 
Education.”
89 Tone Kvernbekk, “The Concept of Evidence in Evidence-Based Practice” (2011) 5 Educational Theory 
515, particularly the discussion that Veridical evidence for a proposition is an ideal state (cf Peircean ideas 
of the “long run” discussed in Cornelis de Waal, Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013)) or a temporary state of certainty in which we consider there is suffi cient “warrant for action” 
(John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: MacMillan, 1938)) and so we can act “as if” the 
evidence were veridical and permanent. This is useful where discussions of potential evidence meet the 
need for certainty in policymakers.
90 Charles Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” Popular Science Monthly (Vol 12, November 1877) p.1.
91 See Carney et al, “The LawWorks Law School Pro Bono and Clinic Report 2014” (n.23).
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Table 1: Types of Evidence (from Achinstein, 2001 and Kvernbekk, 2011)
Epistemic 
situation 
evidence
Subjective 
evidence
Veridical 
evidence
Potential 
evidence
Description Evidence that 
is understood 
within a 
particular 
cultural, 
historical or 
knowledge 
context
Evidence that 
is part of an 
individual or 
group belief 
structure
Evidence that 
transcends 
situations and 
beliefs
Evidence that is 
strongly related 
to experience, 
present and 
future
Requirement That the 
inquirer could 
construct or 
maintain H 
based on the 
E within the 
limitations of 
their context
That the links 
between E and 
H are held to 
be true and 
consistent by 
the inquirer(s)
The data 
supporting 
E need to be 
objective, 
although not 
necessarily 
complete 
(conclusive)
The data 
supporting 
E must be 
objective and 
rigorous and are 
understood not 
to be conclusive
Limitation This belief is 
not challenged 
by ideas from 
beyond the 
epistemic 
context
It is not 
necessary for 
any empirical 
elements to 
come into this 
inquiry
Both E and H 
need to be true 
(very hard to 
establish)
H may be false 
even where 
there is good E 
to support it
Link to 
beliefs
The inquirer 
was justifi ed 
in believing H 
on this E, in 
context.
The inquirer(s) 
believe that 
E is evidence 
for H, that H 
is true, E does 
not have to be 
empirically true, 
provided that it 
is believed.
E is evidence 
for H and 
provides a 
good reason to 
believe H, since 
both E and H 
are true.
E is evidence 
for H and 
provides a 
good reason 
to believe H 
until other E 
emerges to 
challenge
support one another but that as academics and clinicians we must be clearer about how 
we are constructing our arguments: the a priori logic of a subjective response may be 
strong and the data from a potential study constructed to deductively explore the logic 
may be rigorous. This does not mean that together they are unassailable. The logic of 
the subjective response is falsifi able both through a competing a priori argument and/
or through the failure of the data to support the hypothesis. Indeed, if we can ever get 
close to veridical evidence, it is by putting all forms of argument into harm’s way both 
from their natural enemies and from the potential challenge of other forms of evidence.
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Table 2: UK Clinics Favour Educational Goals 9293949596
Epistemic 
situation 
evidence
Subjective 
evidence
Veridical 
evidence
Potential 
evidence
The tradition of 
legal aid means 
that, until recently, 
student clinics 
have not been 
driven by the need 
to provide basic 
and emergency 
services. Our 
culture has allowed 
more focus on 
students’ learning 
opportunities.
Clinic experience 
and high-
performing students 
go hand in hand. 
These students go 
on to be active pro 
bono professionals. 
There is a positive 
cycle or ecosystem 
at work.
Clinical experience 
teaches specifi c 
knowledge and 
skills unavailable 
through other 
routes92/does it 
better than other 
forms of teaching 
(eg, traditional or 
simulation93).
Students express 
high levels of 
satisfaction 
with clinical 
programmes,94 
demonstrate skills 
development that 
could be linked to 
employability95 and 
perform better in 
other areas after 
clinic.96
A further challenge to our mental architecture in relation to clinic is to imagine the 
ideal conditions for collecting potential or veridical evidence based on this belief 
system and compare this to the reality in the fi eld. If it were the case that educational 
benefi ts are as important as social justice benefi ts, several key indicators such as 
equality of opportunity and access for students, central position and value shown 
through credit-bearing and clinical skills as the focus of assessment and impact on 
the fi nal grade would arguably need to be present to indicate these values being 
expressed in practice (Figure 1).
Where one or more of these factors is absent, it becomes necessary to challenge 
the originally stated value, the extent to which it is subordinate to other values or 
pressures in the environment and therefore the extent to which it could potentially 
be shaping the learning experience.
92 Unsurprisingly, there are no data as yet to support this assertion that meets the veridical threshold.
93 Limited data, much contested on both sides of this assertion, see Richard Grimes, Learning through 
Experience: Developing Clinical Models for Legal Education (PhD Dissertation, Northumbria University, 
2017).
94 Rachel Dunn, “The Taxonomy of Clinics: The Realities and Risks of All Forms of Clinical Legal 
Education” (2016) 3(2) Asian Journal of Legal Education 174.
95 Jill Alexander and Carol Boothby, “Framing Clinical Legal Education at Northumbria Law School: 
Challenges Old and New” (forthcoming, 2018) 5 German Journal of Legal Education.
96 Elaine Hall, Cath Sylvester and Carol Boothby, “Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt? Using Large Data 
Sets to Explore the Impact of Clinical Education” (Seminar, IJCLE/ACCLE Conference, Toronto, July 
2016); Sylvester, Hall and O’Boyle, this volume.
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II. Do Values Change at University and If So, How?
This section seeks to unpack the “taken-for-granted” in academics’ discourse about 
what we do and to expose some of our assumptions, abductive leaps and fondly held 
beliefs to critical scrutiny. In the spirit of Peirce,97 this process is intended to assuage 
our discomfort, since we are no longer satisfi ed in the fi xed beliefs about the plasticity 
of students’ values and how that idea sits within a relatively straightforward model 
of transformative higher education. We make no claims to reaching full scientifi c 
enquiries on each of the points raised, since we have not the resource or expertise to 
do so. Nevertheless, we want to signpost where the method of authority has been used 
in respect of psychological and neuroscientifi c literature and where the method of 
a priori has been used and make clear the logical stutter and fl ow of our constructions.
97 See Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” (n.90).
Figure 1: Decision Tree Exploring the Central Position of Clinic in the 
Curriculum
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A. Becoming a person — the formation of values and 
beliefs into early adulthood
The age of criminal responsibility has varied across history and culture with a great 
deal of ahistorical and culturally imperialist snootiness about others’ practices 
compared to our (exemplary) own.98 There remains, however, a thread of awareness 
that there is a point in a young person’s cognitive and moral development when 
they understand both that there is a concept of right and wrong and that this concept 
applies directly to their own actions. A number of ideas cluster around this thread: 
that this happens at different ages for individuals and that locally constructed norms 
of right and wrong may vary are relatively uncontroversial addenda; that good and 
evil are innate in the individual has become relatively unfashionable; and cultural 
primacy (particularly in the academy) is given to the notion that values and virtues 
are acquired socially. Where is this process of “virtue acquisition” happening and 
what do we (think we) know about how?
(i) Family and culture
In this section, we are primarily using the method of authority, drawing on an 
integrative psychotherapeutic literature to provide a narrative of development 
that is rooted in individuals’ experience. The neuroscientifi c perspective on 
the development of the self is not entirely absent from this discourse, but it is 
subordinated to metaphors of the social world. The world of the infant is initially 
undifferentiated: there are no “others” and everything revolves around the child’s 
sensory gratifi cation.99 It is through the inevitable and healthy frustrations of desire 
and the disappointments of the fallible fl esh that the infant develops both a sense of 
good and bad experience from their own point of view as well as a sense of others 
as meaningful and separate individuals.100 Gradually, the child develops from this 
sense of self and others a self-consciousness.101 The child comes to understand their 
role in the family, the location of power and the thoughts feelings and actions that 
are and are not permitted:102 some of this comes through explicit family messages 
 98 Problematised by Raymond Arthur, “Exploring Childhood, Criminal Responsibility and the Evolving 
Capacities of the Child: The Age of Criminal Responsibility in England and Wales” (2016) 67(3) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 269.
 99 Louis Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain (New York: Norton, 
2002).
100 Allan Schore, “Minds in the Making: Attachment, the Self-organising Brain and Developmentally-
Oriented Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy” (2001) 17(3) British Journal of Psychotherapy 299–328; 
Allan Schore, “The Effects of a Secure Attachment Relationship on Right Brain Development, Affect 
Regulation and Infant Mental Health” (2001) 22 Infant Mental Health Journal 7.
101 Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy (London: Constable 
& Robinson, 1961); Jeremy Holmes, The Search for the Secure Base: Attachment Theory and 
Psychotherapy (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2001).
102 Donald Winnicott, “The Theory of the Parent-Child Relationship” (1960) 41 International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis 585; Ronald Laing and Aaron Esterson, Sanity, Madness and the Family (Oxford: 
Routledge, 1964).
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and the overt use of reward and sanction103 and some from less overt sources. Most 
of us can call to mind an example from childhood when we learned via a sanction 
that it was not ok to bite your sister.104 We internalised and generalised105 this 
experience so that, when we went to school, we were aware that biting others (no 
matter how annoying they were) was likely to also be not ok. There is a high level 
of social convergence across time and cultures in acceptable public behaviour, 
suggesting that the performance of “good” is something we curate quite well, 
passing on to our children the skills of seeming that we ourselves have learned. 
It is a different thing to be and to seem, and the evidence base for each has only a 
small amount of overlap.
This is where the less explicit messages in the family are important, since this 
is where the critical divergence begins. We have observed that generally there 
is agreement that it is not ok to bite your sister and that this principle can be 
expanded to other contexts and individuals. However, at the moment or moments 
where we built this understanding, each of us will have developed different 
contextual moral architecture which will impact our position when we meet new 
laws or dilemmas:
[empathetic] because it hurts and nobody likes to be hurt;
[pragmatic] because she shrieked and nearly made mummy drop something 
and so mummy got angry;
[avoidant] because the smack I got hurt a lot. 
This is where the microsystem106 of the family makes a signifi cant difference 
because what is “normal for round here” is interpreted by the child as a fundamental 
truth and carried unconsciously on into later life. It may not be the intention of the 
parents and carers in that moment to reinforce a pragmatic over an empathetic 
understanding of why something is not acceptable nor is it necessarily morally or 
objectively “better” to follow a particular route. It is just very important to recognise 
that the reasons why a group of people exhibit a socially acceptable behaviour 
are going to be variable in both type and intensity, so any argument that assumes 
convergence of understanding and motive underneath a convergent behaviour is 
likely to be fl awed.
In the next section, we draw on the history, philosophy and sociology of 
education literature to understand where our concepts about learning, the infl uence 
of the educator and the plasticity of belief might have come from.
103 Barry Singer, “Psychological Studies of Punishment” (1970) 58(2) California Law Review 405.
104 A personal example, please insert your own relevant equivalent.
105 Daniel Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (Oxford: Routledge, 1985).
106 Urie Bronfenbrenner, “The Experimental Ecology of Education” (1976) 5(9) Educational Researcher 5.
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(ii) “Give me the child before he is seven and I will show you the man”
The juxtaposition does seem a little unfair to the Jesuits.107 Was Loyola really 
claiming that the education offered was producing a whole batch of similarly clean 
souls or just that shaping habitual behaviour in a pro-Christian, pro-social manner 
would increase the chances that each individual would fi nd their own best life and 
chance of salvation? Nevertheless, the idea of education as a civilising force is 
central to this article and needs unpacking, regardless of whether we can blame the 
Jesuits. It is fi rst quite important to describe the positionality of “the child” in this 
debate: for philosophers and educational theorists up until the 19th century, the child 
is most defi nitely a boy and one from a privileged background and the education 
he experiences is one that will prepare him for a leadership role in his family, his 
community and beyond, so whether the aim is to replicate received wisdom or to 
disrupt and develop new understanding it is located within this powerful position. 
Whether the desire is to make him “good”, “effective” or indeed both, the purpose of 
this education is for a wider societal good, the child’s learning will be the society’s 
protection and advancement. The concept of “basic education” was viewed with 
suspicion; it was deemed necessary to have rich, individualised and challenging 
educational experiences to come away with any benefi ts: “A little learning is a 
dangerous thing; drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: there shallow draughts 
intoxicate the brain, and drinking largely sobers us again.”108 However, by the end 
of the 19th century, the policy of mass education had become increasingly visible in 
the legal and political structures in Europe and America, with an emphasis on basic 
skills for men and an increasing number of women.109 This can be seen as a purely 
economic phenomenon that the development of industry and commerce produced 
both demand-side (skilled labour) and supply-side (literate consumer) drivers. 
However, the impetus for mass education also came from religious and social concerns 
about the depravity of the industrial cities: whether empirically true that moral 
decay was increasing, it was certainly true that the distressing sights of poverty and 
desperation were more visible. Moreover, in the cities, inequalities were juxtaposed 
without the restraint of tradition and small communities and so crimes, particularly 
those against property, increased.110 Thus, although the cognitive curriculum of 
the early schools was basic literacy and numeracy, they all had an explicit moral 
107 Particularly when you consider that Loyola probably did not say this. Arnold Beichman et al, Three 
Myths (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1981) p.48: posit that this saying was “attributed to him 
(perhaps mischievously) by Voltaire”.
108 Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism (1709). Printed for W Lewis in Russel Street, Covent Garden and 
sold by W Taylor at the Ship in Pater-Noster Row, T Osborn near the Walks, and J Graves in St James 
Street.
109 Paul Bolton, “Education: Historical Statistics” (Commons Briefi ng SN/SG/4252, House of Commons 
Library, 28 November 2012): free primary education for all in England comes in the Education Act 
1918, which also raises the school leaving age from 12 to 14 years.
110 For an overview, Clive Emsley, “Crime and Punishment: 10 Years of Research” (2005) 9(1) Crime, 
Histoire & Societies 117.
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curriculum as well, one in which “good” was assessed through displays of passive 
behaviour and deference to authority fi gures. The underlying pedagogic theory is 
one of exposure: “the child” has not yet absorbed the requisite good, by exposing 
him to it in this institution we will make sure he “gets” it and we will know that he 
“gets” it because he will not transgress. However, it is only recently that neuroscience 
has offered the tantalising possibility that we can view that process in real time, 
potentially giving insight into the difference — if any — between being and seeming.
B. Is neuroscience any help in understanding 
cognitive architecture?
There is an ongoing fi ght against “neuromyths”,111 and the tired metaphors of 20th 
century attempts to understand the structure of the brain which need not detain 
us here. Neuroscientists are not offering the snake-oil promises of old, although 
more cautious commentators question the nature of the observations themselves, 
for example, neuroimages:
“are not photographs of the brain in action in real time … beautiful colour-
dappled images are actually representations of particular areas in the brain 
that are working the hardest as measured by increased oxygen consumption 
… Despite well-informed inferences … it is very diffi cult for scientists to 
look at a fi ery spot on a brain scan and conclude with certainty what is 
going on in the mind of a person.”112
Nevertheless, recent advances mean that our understanding of processes and 
structures in the brain is at a new level of detail and sophistication: one which is 
cautious about the physical traces of complex processes; which takes into account 
the interaction between genetics and environment; and which is cautious about 
the implications of data relating to cohort averages for predicting individual 
functioning.113 There is a growing community working actively to translate the 
observations of brain development and activity for teachers and considering the 
curriculum design, pedagogy and assessment implications of these observations.114 
However, there are important caveats, even from these dedicated advocates: 
111 Phillip Newton, “The Learning Styles Myth Is Thriving in Higher Education” (2015) Frontiers in 
Psychology 1908; Elaine Hall, “The Tenacity of Learning Styles: A Response to Lodge, Hansen, and 
Cottrell” (2016) 2(1) Learning: Research and Practice 18.
112 Sally Satel and Scott Lilienfeld, Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience 
(New York: Basic Books, 2015) pp.4–5.
113 Lucy Foulkes and Sarah-Jane Blakemore, “Studying Individual Differences in Human Adolescent Brain 
Development” (2018) 21 Nature Neuroscience 315.
114 See, for example, the 2018 special issue created for the Chartered College of Teachers and particularly 
Paul Howard-Jones et al, “Applying the Science of Learning in the Classroom” Impact (February 
2018), available at impact.chartered.college/article/howard-jones-applying-science-learning-classroom/ 
(visited 10 March 2018).
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“Although the science provides principles and a scientifi cally determined 
understanding of how learning works, based on concrete measurement of 
behaviour and brain function, it does not provide a list of ‘top tips’ or practices 
that are guaranteed to work with any class or individual in any context.”115
The overall picture from this fi eld is that we do not yet have a granularity of 
knowledge suffi cient to explain the microprocesses in the brain, and while there 
are exciting terms — subcortical structures, neuromodulators — in play, they are 
operating as powerful metaphors rather than maps for practice. Interestingly, while 
some academics have posited a tension between biological and psychological 
understandings of learning, empirical evidence of change can be seen in the 
overlap: training in neuroscience ideas has an impact on learners’ belief in their 
ability to learn,116 although not their short-term achievement. Mastery and self-
concept researchers117 have suggested that changes in belief take time to transfer 
into impact on attainment, but the relatively small number of long-term studies 
indicate that belief in the possibility of change is more critical to performance in 
college and lifelong learning than prior attainment.
This seems to indicate that physical routes to attitude change might be 
discoverable, but we are positing their existence on demonstrations (or failed 
demonstrations) of behavioural or cognitive change:
 “‘These early experimenters,’ the D.H.C. was saying, ‘were on the wrong 
track. They thought that hypnopædia could be made an instrument of 
intellectual education …’
‘The - Nile - is - the - longest - river - in - Africa - and - the - second - in - 
length - of - all - the - rivers - of - the - globe…’ The words come rushing 
out. ‘Although - falling - short - of …’
‘Well now, which is the longest river in Africa?’
The eyes are blank. ‘I don’t know.’”118
Huxley’s example makes clear that we can spot where the brain has been washed 
in information, but the information has not been converted into knowledge. His 
characters were unable to learn cognitively from repetition in sleep, but they were 
able to absorb social conditioning and to accept the values and norms of their culture. 
115 Ibid.
116 Eleanor Dommett et al, “The Impact of Participation in a Neuroscience Course on Motivational 
Measures and Academic Performance” (2013) 2 Trends in Neuroscience and Education 122.
117 Herbert Marsh and Richard Shavelson, “Self-concept: Its Multifaceted, Hierarchical Structure” (1985) 
20(3) Educational Psychologist 107; Carol Dweck, “From Needs to Goals and Representations: 
Foundations for a Unifi ed Theory of Motivation, Personality, and Development” (2017) 124(6) 
Psychological Review 689.
118 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Harmondsworth: Chatto & Windus, 1932) pp.54–60.
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However, the crux of the story is that these too were a veneer of performance: Bernard 
cynically enacted while rejecting the values, and Lenina, who appears a true believer, 
is not revolted but excited by savage John’s difference and rejects him not because of 
his violation of societal rules but because he worships her in an unfamiliar way. The 
critical question, given that “social normativity thus does not account for all of our 
cognitive competence”,119 is whether we can tell the difference between conversion 
and performance for students encountering our moral curriculum.
While values and virtues education have developed into discrete disciplines 
since that time, they have not moved much beyond this exposure model and the main 
problem with the exposure/inoculation model is the observation of adolescence, 
where transgression is not only something that happens but something that seems to 
be developmentally necessary. We return, therefore, to the psychological literature.
(i) The second rapprochement phase: “Only Morrissey understands me”
As toddlers, we begin to explore the world, our relationship with important others 
and our self-consciousness by playing with the boundaries of safety and danger, 
conformity and transgression. This often takes the form of running away to the 
other side of the swings when it is “time to go home” and having to be coaxed/
chased/carried. This developmental phase, rapprochement,120 is important in that 
it gives each individual a degree of authorship in their own narrative, choosing 
both when and how to act and how to understand the outcomes of the action. 
Traditionally, psychotherapy literature recognises two rapprochements: one as the 
very young child separates physically (and emotionally) from the family and then 
later as the adolescent separates cognitively/emotionally (and physically).121 The 
adolescent seeks to form their identity through new rounds of attachment processes 
of idealisation and twinning with self-chosen others, while still seeking to elicit 
response through the impact transference122 from the (apparently despised) primary 
attachment fi gures. Emerging neuroscientifi c data123 on adolescent brain functioning 
suggest a biochemical and electrical model for self-absorption, which can also be 
understood through metaphors of focus and attention: it is a big job to form a sense 
of self and quite possibly nobody outside the self can really understand.
Though experienced by parents and authority fi gures as rejection, it is possible 
to view adolescent behaviour as a critical and indeed scientifi c endeavour in which 
119 Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Heidegger and the ‘Cartesian Brainwash’ — Towards a Non-Individualistic 
Account of ‘Dasein’” (2004) 35(2) Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 132.
120 Margaret Mahler et al, The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
121 Heinz Kohut, How Does Analysis Cure? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
122 The talionic impulse (the desire to evoke pain in others) is only part of adolescent “acting out”. More 
crucially, it is the ability to shock and evoke response from an important, loved other that is critical. 
James Masterson, The Search for the Real Self: Unmasking the Personality Disorders of Our Age 
(New York: The Free Press, 1988).
123 Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Inventing Ourselves: The Secret Life of the Teenage Brain (London: Doubleday, 
2018).
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received wisdom is tested against alternatives. Nor is this a battle to the death: the 
extent to which the new models of the world are incorporated into the old echoes 
the adaptation of indigenous faith behaviours into colonised religious practice,124 
from both the old and the new, we keep that which is meaningful and valuable to us, 
weaving it together. This last is more often than not a conscious activity, since the 
adolescent is actively seeking a comfortable enough identity as a way of managing 
self-consciousness and is asking themselves aspirational and moral questions about 
how they are in the world and how they want to be. Therefore, at the point of 
applying for higher education, the young person will be somewhere in their second 
rapprochement,125 with a world view accreted over time from their family of origin, 
their experience — passive and active — in the worlds of school, community and 
friendships and their emerging conscious philosophy.
(ii) Is university subject choice an identity project?
At a recent international clinical conference, colleagues reporting on their students’ 
wonderful work with prisoners referred to the group as “baby lawyers”. There was 
laughter and nodding in the room, this was a way of referencing the students that 
resonated with the audience: they were at the beginning of a journey to become like 
us, in fact they were already like us, part of the family. Refl ecting on it now, it seems 
to contain a number of rather cosy assumptions about what students are doing on a 
law course. Do all the fresh-faced fi rst years defi nitely want to be something legal: 
solicitors, barristers, in-house counsel, legal advisors? Are they choosing a shared 
identity with us, based on core values and beliefs? How do we (think we) know this?
The landscape of higher education participation is an important background 
for this discussion. In the United Kingdom,126 participation in higher education 
increased from 3.4 per cent in 1950, to 8.4 per cent in 1970, 19.3 per cent in 1990 
and 33 per cent in 2000, shifting over a couple of generations from a minority 
to a mainstream activity.127 Levels of participation adjusted to the proportion of 
the population of young people entering fi rst degrees (a slightly different measure, 
excluding mature and part-time students, which may be a more useful fi gure for 
the purpose of this article) show that in 2015, 31 per cent of 18-year olds had 
a university place.128 This expansion of participation is not evenly spread across 
124 Victoria Bricker, The Indian Christ, the Indian King: The Historical Substrate of Maya Myth and Ritual 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
125 Increasingly, psychotherapists are considering the possibility that we never complete the work of the 
rapprochement and that we are always working on this in one form or another until we die.
126 This section refl ects very particularly on the Higher Education context in England and Wales, and 
while there are common factors in other countries, we make no claims for a smooth translation to other 
jurisdictions and training regimes.
127 See Bolton, “Education: Historical Statistics” (n.109) p.14.
128 Full Fact, “Are There Record Numbers of Young People Going to University?” (1 August 2016), 
available at https://fullfact.org/education/are-there-record-numbers-young-people-going-university/ 
(visited 12 March 2018); UCAS, “End of Cycle Report 2015” (December 2015), available at www.ucas.
com/sites/default/fi les/eoc-report-2015-v2.pdf (visited 10 March 2018).
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society,129 but nevertheless it does represent a different market for law schools as 
the young people deciding on their courses are signifi cantly less likely to have 
family knowledge and traditions to draw upon than previous cohorts. The decision 
about which course, at which institution is a complex one, and although a huge 
amount of metrical data are publicly available, the interpretation of them is diffi cult 
since they mostly refl ect the experiences and outcomes of previous cohorts.
When lawyers were made in law offi ces,130 those young men who became 
articled clerks might reasonably be assumed to be entering upon and committing to 
a profession just as their brothers joined the Navy or the Church, either as members 
of the elite moving from their academic education to a professional practice or as 
members of the aspirant middle classes seeking to become a part of a professional 
community through the acquisition of skills. Although the composition of the legal 
profession131 in general and the elite in particular (the “Magic Circle” fi rms, the 
Bar and the judiciary)132 still demonstrates that social and cultural capital are more 
important than skills,133 the entrance to an undergraduate law degree by any student 
is not a particularly good predictor of working as a lawyer.134
The purpose of higher education is a divisive subject. By defi nition, a university 
is “a high-level educational institution in which students study for degrees and 
academic research is done”.135 However, it is arguable that a university is much more 
than an institution for the creation and teaching of knowledge. In the 16th century, 
Francis Bacon espoused that knowledge should be useful stating that it “may not 
129 UCAS, “Record Number of 18 Year Olds Accepted to University This Year, UCAS Report Shows” 
(UCAS, 14 December 2016), available at www.ucas.com/corporate/news-and-key-documents/news/
record-numbers-18-year-olds-accepted-university-year-ucas-report-shows (visited 10 March 2018): 
Of the fi fth of the young English population from backgrounds with the lowest entry rate to higher 
education, 13.6 per cent entered university in 2016, a rise from 13.5 per cent in 2015 (an increase of 
0.1 per cent point). The young people in this group typically have lower family incomes, live in areas 
where fewer people go to university, attend state schools and are more likely to be men or in the White 
ethnic group. In comparison, of the fi fth of young people from backgrounds with the highest entry rate, 
52.1 per cent went to university in 2016, an increase of 1.2 per cent points. Young people in this group are 
more likely to come from higher income families, live in advantaged areas, attend independent schools 
or be women or in the Asian or Chinese ethnic groups. Those from backgrounds with the highest entry 
rates were 3.8 times more likely to enter university in 2016 than their peers with the lowest entry rates.
130 Michael Eraut, Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence (Oxford: Routledge, 1994).
131 At least in England and Wales, for which we have access to data.
132 Rosaline Sullivan, “Barriers to the Legal Profession Legal Services Board” (Legal Services Board, 
2010); Louise Ashley et al, A Qualitative Evaluation of Non-educational Barriers to the Elite Professions 
(Report for the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, 2015).
133 Andrew M Francis, “Legal Education, Social Mobility and Employability: Possible Selves, Curriculum 
Intervention, and the Role of Legal Work Experience” (2015) 42(2) Journal of Law and Society 173.
134 With the exception of a small number of institutions which offer Exempting degrees, all law graduates 
have to complete an additional year (on a Legal Practice Course (LPC) or Bar Practitioners Training 
Course (BPTC)) to be eligible for entry into the profession. Access for non-law graduates to the 
professional course is through the Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL), an additional year. Current routes 
therefore are typically six to seven years long: three-year Law undergraduate plus LPC/BPTC plus two 
years training contract/pupillage or three-year undergraduate plus GDL, plus LPC/BPTC plus two years 
training contract/pupillage.
135 Oxford Dictionaries, “University”, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/defi nition/university.
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be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and 
gain to her master’s use; but as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort”.136
Students enter higher education for a myriad of reasons. The factors range from 
an interest in the subject to a desire to obtain a particular job requiring a particular 
qualifi cation. One study reported that 47 per cent of respondent students cited “To 
help get a job or better job” or “Wanted to pursue a particular career and needed a 
qualifi cation” as the most important reason for entering higher education.137 In contrast, 
16 per cent of respondent students cited interest in the subject as the most important 
reason. The competing objectives of higher education also highlight the confl ict 
between various stakeholders. While students want more “skills and employability-
based activities”, academics have expressed concern that there is “less room … to 
teach philosophy, theory, rights, justice, the liberal arts kind of side of it”.138
A law degree is a professional degree. In most, if not all jurisdictions, prospective 
lawyers are required to have an academic qualifi cation before seeking admission to 
the profession. For example, in England and Wales, a Qualifying Law Degree is 
the most common route to qualifi cation as a solicitor or a barrister.139 In the United 
States, admission to the bar in most states require some form of attendance and 
qualifi cation from a law school prior to taking the bar exam. In New York state, s.520 
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors 
at Law prescribes fours routes for an applicant to qualify to take the New York Bar 
Exam, all of which require some form of classroom study at a law school.
With this in mind, we must consider what a legal education at university 
teaches students: is it merely legal doctrine providing students with knowledge 
of the framework, rules and procedural steps they will encounter within the legal 
system? Alternatively, should legal education encompass more than knowledge and 
seek to broaden the individual? Cramton considered the “ordinary religion” of the 
law school as including:
“a skeptical attitude toward generalizations; an instrumental approach to law 
and lawyering; a ‘tough-minded’ and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and 
professional roles; and a faith that man, by the application of his reason and 
the use of democratic processes, can make the world a better place.”140
136 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning in the Works of Francis Bacon (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 
1844) p.174.
137 C Callender (undated), “Full and Part-Time Students in Higher Education: Their Experiences and 
Expectations”, available at www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/ncihe/report2.htm (visited 01 March 18).
138 Legal Education and Training Review, Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and 
Training Regulation in England and Wales (LETR, June 2013) p.45.
139 Although it should be noted that under proposals made Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) for the 
introduction of Solicitors Qualifying Examination, new solicitors would not be required to hold a law 
degree. For further information, see Solicitors Regulation Authority, “A New Route to Qualifi cation: 
The Solicitors Qualifying Examination”, available at www.sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/solicitors-
qualifying-examination.page (visited 10 March 2018).
140 Roger Cramton, “The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom” (1978) 29 Journal of Legal 
Education 247, 248.
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In regard to values, Cramton stated that the lawyer is “engaged in the implementation 
of the values of others … he need not be concerned directly with value questions”. 
Further, Cramton also expressed that emotion, imagination, sentiments of affection 
and trust and a sense of wonder or awe at the inexplicable are “off limits for law 
students and lawyers”.141 The traditional approach to lawyering is to dehumanise 
the case to use legal skill to achieve the desired outcome, whether that is for the 
client or a cause. Finally, Cramton highlighted that faith in that the world can be 
a better place through application of reason and the use of a democratic process 
allows the pursuit of social justice.142 It is recognised that in a “pluralistic and 
tolerant society”, it is unlikely that there will be unanimous consensus as the 
morally virtuous outcome. However, if there is consensus on the decision-making, 
society will be a better place. The law school is a training ground for those who 
wish to function within the existing system. The aim of all education, including 
legal education, should be the encouragement of self-learning that includes the 
mind, spirit and body of the whole person.143
A key fi nding of the Legal Education and Training Review (LETR) relates 
to the teaching of legal ethics and professional values. The report found that 
ethics and professionalism were areas of knowledge lacking among new 
recruits.144 While many elements of a traditional legal education were relevant, 
there was a perceived need to increase the emphasis on teaching legal ethics 
and legal values.145
The QAA states that the skills and qualities of mind for a graduate of law 
include, inter alia, “an awareness of principles and values of law and justice, and 
of ethics”.146 A contextual statement was added to the 2015 Benchmark Statements 
to refl ect ethical awareness which states:
“At undergraduate level students are aware of the consequences of law as 
a human creation and that it is subject to the ethics and values of those that 
make and apply it. The implications of this in the context of securing justice 
and the public interest is considered as part of legal study. Law schools 
will determine for themselves how ethics are addressed in the curriculum, 
but it is expected that students will have opportunities to discuss ethical 
questions and dilemmas that arise in law and to consider the features of 
ethical decision making.”147
141 Ibid., p.250.
142 Ibid., p.251.
143 Ibid., p.263.
144 See Legal Education Training Review, Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and 
Training Regulation in England and Wales” (n.138) p.34.
145 Ibid., p.45.
146 See Quality Assurance Agency, “Subject Benchmark Statement: Law (2015)” (n.1) p.7.
147 Ibid., p.6.
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The inclusion of the benchmark statement is recognition that ethics and values are 
at the core of legal education. The statements go some way to address the concerns 
raised in the LETR report. If we accept that ethics and values should be addressed 
in legal education, what are those ethics and values?
A starting point may be to adopt professional ethics as prescribed by the 
relevant code of conduct published by the relevant regulatory body. We teach 
our students the rules that set out how one must act in any given situation. The 
problem with this approach in England and Wales is the shift to Outcomes Focused 
Regulation (OFR).148 The emphasis was on acting in a principled manner rather than 
in compliance with particular rules. The approach to ethical learning is different as 
students need to learn how to make professional judgments rather than adopting a 
deontological approach.149
Legal education is very fond of comparing itself to medical education,150 
but there are some very important structural differences in the way in which the 
higher education market works for these two subjects. On the supply side, the 
number of places for medical students in England and Wales is fi rmly controlled: 
it is an expensive training, heavily subsidised by the government, so complex 
calculations are made to predict how many cardiologists, renal specialists and 
general practitioners will be needed, and recruitment is tailored to this, taking 
into account how many potential doctors will change their minds en route.151 
Law schools in contrast are limited in their recruitment only by the size of their 
classrooms and the workloads of their staff, as well perhaps as the reputational 
trade-off of large courses. Despite the heavy use of wigs on our websites, we 
know that very few of our students will ever get to wear one. If fewer than half of 
law students go on to be lawyers,152 is that because there simply are not enough 
jobs? The pattern of employment in the law for law graduates is infl uenced but not 
determined by the ranking of the institution: it is certainly the case that graduates 
of Oxford or Cambridge who want training contracts are more likely to get them 
than graduates of Nottingham or Northumbria, but it seems equally the case 
that the currency of a law degree is not limited to the law. Law graduates from 
any institution can put that degree together with their other inherited or accrued 
cultural capital in exchange for jobs in linked fi elds such as business, politics, 
local and national government.
148 The SRA moved to OFR in October 2011.
149 Andrew Boon, “Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007” (2010) 17(3) International Journal 
of the Legal Profession 195.
150 Paul Maharg, Transforming Legal Education: Learning and Teaching the Law in the Early Twenty-First 
Century (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007).
151 Vivienne Baumfi eld, Understanding Cost, Value and Quality in Professional Learning: What Can 
Teacher Educators, Medical Educators and Legal Educators Learn through Co-inquiry? (Symposium on 
the BERA Research Commission, The British Educational Research Association Conference, University 
of Leeds, September 2016).
152 Something that has been an area of concern for 50 years. JC York and RD Hale, “Too Many Lawyers? 
The Legal Services Industry: Its Structure and Outlook” (1973) 26 J Legal Educ 1.
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Does that mean that law schools with wig-based marketing campaigns are 
operating in bad faith? Many legal education scholars would argue that they are 
not,153 since the role of the law school is not to produce a practitioner but rather 
a graduate who “thinks like a lawyer”. This “liberal arts” view of the law degree 
has its roots in the academic background of the elite entrant to the lawyers’ 
offi ce, where the history, culture and philosophy of the law are studied, and the 
hermeneutic skills of legal argument, writing and research are treated not as skills 
as such, rather as cultural and behavioural norms, acquired by osmosis.154 In 
contrast, the “disciplinary practitioner” faction make much of the transferability of 
the embedded skills development in their degrees.155
To sum up, we have a much larger cohort of law students. We are not sure 
why they have chosen to study law, since there are many career routes open to law 
graduates and the choice of law may refl ect nothing more than a slight preference 
for three years doing this rather than history or business. We are not confi dent that 
we can facilitate their transition to legal professionalism and we know that access 
is structurally limited by class, culture capital. Why then, does this meme of shared 
identity persist and why do we think it can be intensifi ed through the university 
experience?
C. University education as transformation
We like to characterise the work that we do as meaningful and of high quality. 
This section unpacks this using more precise philosophical language156 since 
we need to be careful about the elision of different kinds of quality (Figure 2): 
fi tness defi ned by a regulatory body157 is not the same as fi tness as defi ned by the 
learners in an andragogic environment;158 the democratic benefi ts of perfection, 
in which everyone has access to an identical experience, are in confl ict with a 
curriculum of enquiry that privileges individual transformative experiences of 
dissonance.159
153 Anthony Bradney, Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-fi rst 
Century (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003); Jess Guth and Chris Ashford, “The Legal Education 
and Training Review: Regulating Socio-Legal and Liberal Legal Education?” (2014) 48(1) The Law 
Teacher 519.
154 Chris Ashford, “Response: The Needs of the Legal Profession and the Liberal Law School: (Re)
negotiating Boundaries” in Chris Ashford, Nigel Duncan and Jessica Guth (eds), Perspectives on Legal 
Education: Contemporary Responses to the Lord Upjohn Lectures (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015) 
p.177.
155 Ibid. The gap between these factions is much more visible to them than to the outsider.
156 Drawing on Line Wittek and Tone Kvernbekk, “On the Problems of Asking for a Defi nition of Quality 
in Education” (2011) 55(6) Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research 671.
157 For example, the Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority in England and Wales.
158 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1996).
159 Jack Mezirow, “Transformative Learning as Discourse” (2003) 1 Journal of Transformative Education 58.
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Figure 2: Five Types of Quality160
Therefore, effective and rigorous valuations of quality need to be predicated upon 
explorations of academics’ core beliefs and values as educators and gatekeepers 
to the profession. If we return to the belief that the educational benefi t of clinic 
is privileged in the United Kingdom over social justice goals, there are different 
critical questions to ask depending on our preferred indicator of quality. If we believe 
that clinic is an elite activity, one for which only the most academically successful 
students are fi tted, then the way in which we set up, evaluate and develop clinic 
would conform to “quality as exception” standards. However, if the belief is that 
clinic is an educational “good” for all students we would strive towards “quality as 
perfection” standards, where the important elements of clinic can be part of a “core 
offer”. Our decisions about what are the important elements might be informed 
by the “quality as fi tness” criteria derived from theory, from legal regulators, 
from employers or from a combination of these. Given how labour-intensive and 
potentially risky clinics are, we would have to engage with “quality as value”.
In this article, we are principally concerned to deal with claims for clinical 
experiences as transformational, with equal emphasis on “clinic” and “experience”. 
We engage with the weak framing of experiential learning161 as a transformative 
experience, not simply in cognitive terms but in terms of personal and professional 
identity. The international move towards an increasingly outcomes-based approach 
to legal education and training has raised the profi le and encouraged the development 
160 See Wittek and Kvernbekk, “On the Problems of Asking for a Defi nition of Quality in Education” 
(n.156): drawn from Wittek and Kvernbekk’s analysis of Mari Elken’s literature review.
161 Barbera Bernstein, Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity, Theory, Research, Critique (London: 
Taylor & Francis, 1996); Reijo Miettinen, “The Concept of Experiential Learning and John Dewey’s 
Theory of Refl ective Thought and Action” (2000) 19(1) International Journal of Lifelong Education 54.
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of a wide range of experiential learning practices. These are often described by 
students as “the highlight of my degree”, but they are not there simply for attraction 
and variety. There is an implicit pedagogic intent which is based in part on broad 
Higher Education outcomes of graduate skills and “public good” graduates162 and 
in part on an implicit sense of what it is to be a member of that discipline.
The problems of defi nition (“what is clinic?”) are inseparable from the intent 
of the pedagogue (“what is clinic for?”) and, as these can only be tested empirically 
through the experience of participants (“how well did clinic do….?”), our contention 
is that intent must be the point of focus, where we start and continually return in a 
refl exive feedback loop based on the essentially Pragmatist questions of purpose, 
fi tness and continuing enquiry.163
Broadly, three kinds of claims are being made (Table 3) which rest on a variety 
of potential core beliefs about students, learning and the law and which have a 
range of supporting evidence. There are claims relating to experiential learning 
and dissonance; claims relating to the operationalising of rote and tacit knowledge 
and the development of practice expertise; and fi nally, claims about being and 
becoming through a process of observation and modelling.
Table 3: Forms of Claim Made about the Transformational Nature of Clinic 164165166
Learning as an event: 
“exposure” and 
“contact” pedagogies164
Knowing in 
context: expertise-
related threshold 
concepts165
Ways of knowing: 
socialisation and 
professional values166
Claim Students are transformed…
by the contact with 
clients from different 
backgrounds and 
communities; they see 
the complexity of the 
problems and attach the 
issues to real lives; they 
develop empathy and 
sociopolitical criticality
by the opportunity 
to apply legal 
knowledge and 
skills, with real-
world standards and 
deadlines, they have 
irreversible insights 
into how to use what 
they have learned
by refl ecting on their 
own professional 
identity; by comparing 
with peers and through 
interaction and 
modelling processes 
with supervisors 
and other legal 
professionals
162 Melanie Walker and Monica McLean, Professional Education, Capabilities and the Public Good: The 
Role of Universities in Promoting Human Development (Oxford: Routledge, 2013).
163 John Dewey, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth” (1941) 38(7) Journal of Philosophy 169.
164 Daniel Powers and Christopher Ellison, “Interracial Contact and Black Racial Attitudes: The Contact 
Hypothesis and Selectivity Bias” (1995) 74(1) Social Forces 205; Helmut Fennes and Karen Hapgood, 
Intercultural Learning in the Classroom: Crossing Borders (London: Cassell, 1997); Basil Singh, “Shared 
Values, Particular Values, and Education for a Multicultural Society” (1995) 47(1) Educational Review 11.
165 Jan Meyer and Ray Land, “Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge (2): Epistemological 
Considerations and a Conceptual Framework for Teaching and Learning” (2005) 49 Higher Education 
373; Melissa Weresh, “Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education” (2014) 63 
Journal of Legal Education 689.
166 See Eraut, Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence (n.130); Etienne Wenger-Trayner et al, 
Learning in Landscapes of Practice: Boundaries, Identity, and Knowledgeability in Practice-Based 
Learning (Oxford: Routledge, 2014).
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How might some of these claims be evidenced? At a minimum, we might demand 
that the terms of reference are made clear and that it is possible to isolate and 
measure the factors involved. In Figure 3, there are three components that might be 
needed to explore the robustness of exposure and contact pedagogies.
Before entering clinic, some baseline assessment of students’ views about 
their clients, the law and access to justice would be needed. How might that be 
gathered? Where students are selected for clinic, they sometimes write about their 
view of clinic as a part of the application: it seems likely that they will either 
already possess values aligned to the clinic or be savvy enough to profess them in 
such circumstances. This leaves no evidential basis to claim transformation, even 
if something more than confi rmation and replication of values has taken place. If 
some robust and authentic measure of students’ views is used, there still remain 
the nature of the clientele and the extent to which contact is a novel or strange 
experience. Intersectional understandings of personhood167 mean that we can no 
longer use simple group descriptors of social class or race and assume that all clients 
and students sit on opposite sides of a divide nor that the routes to understanding 
between clients and students are only mediated through the unravelling of the 
legal problem. Interpersonal factors mean that relationships are more complex and 
moments of connection and identifi cation, as well as of alienation and rejection, 
are diffi cult to predict, track or analyse. This brings us to the third element: the 
procedures in clinic that structurally enable students to refl ect and engage with 
relationships. It is normal for client interactions to be evidenced and analysed in 
the form of notes, discussions and refl ections, and these form the backbone of 
167 Kalwant Bhopal and John Preston (eds), Intersectionality and “Race” in Education (Oxford: Routledge, 
Vol 64, 2012); Angela Ferguson et al, “Intersections of Race-Ethnicity, Gender, and Sexual Minority 
Communities” in Marie Miville and Angela Ferguson (eds), Handbook of Race-Ethnicity and Gender in 
Psychology (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2014) p.45.
Clinic
Students with limited (measurable) 
knowledge/ awareness of issues
Clients with varied issues 
and backgrounds diﬀerent 
to students
Structures within clinical experience 
for recording views and reﬂecng on 
change
Figure 3: Exposure Pedagogy Claims — Some Key Elements Underpinning 
Evidence of Change
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supervision in clinic.168 However, the expressed intent (and perhaps the primary 
intent) of these is to ensure acceptable practice and service for the client. The idea 
that the student’s world view is growing and changing is implicit at best in the 
curriculum as experienced: this means that both supervisor and student have to 
consciously shift away from the core of their work to look at this aspect. Moreover, 
the mechanisms commonly used to track and analyse student–client relationships 
from both perspectives, although commensurate in some ways,169 are uneven in 
terms of essence and power: students may write in depth refl ections and clients may 
tick a Likert scale box. Thus, even where all three of these elements are considered, 
we may not be able to accurately track what happens in the clinic nor make claims 
about “what’s in the arrow”.170
III. Do We Have Great Power and Great Responsibility or 
Delusions of Grandeur?
The psychological and sociological perspectives on the development of the self do 
not offer much support for the idea that any single experience institutes radical re-
shaping: rather the evidence is that each new thing, however, dissonant or shocking, 
becomes part of the existing ecology, woven out of “nature, nurture and fate”.171 
Neuroscience is not ready to help: we do not yet have tools that are suffi ciently 
quick or discriminatory to track the process(es) of learning, and the metaphors 
for change are still only metaphors. Change appears to be both too fast, as in the 
irreversible moments of illumination on achieving a threshold concept,172 and 
too slow, as in the gradual process by which new skills become incorporated into 
practice, temporarily disappearing from awareness into automation and, sometimes, 
re-emerging through metacognitive refl ection as expertise.173 Some students spend 
a few weeks in clinic, most have less than a year: can we envision an a priori model 
of experience and change in which students might reasonably within that limited 
space have a cocktail of cognitive and emotional learning that would result in a 
shift in values? It might well be possible to do this. However, there are signifi cant 
168 Jeff Giddings and Michael McNamara, “Preparing Future Generations of Lawyers for Legal Practice: 
What’s Supervision Got to Do with It” (2014) 37 UNSWLJ 1226.
169 Commensurate in that they are authentic snapshots of views/satisfaction with the relationship. However, 
the imbalance of form and difference in engagement mean that direct comparison or simple triangulation 
is not robust.
170 Judith Little, Nodes and Nets: Investigating Resources for Professional Learning in Schools and 
Networks (Nottingham: National College for School Leadership, 2005).
171 James Masterson and Ralph Klein (eds), Psychotherapy of the Disorders of the Self (London: Brunner-
Routledge, 2013).
172 Elaine Hall, “Grasping the Nettle of Doctorateness” (Paper presented at the 2016 International 
Conference on the Professional Doctorate, Belfast, to appear in the Special Issue of Studies in Continuing 
Education) (in press, 2018).
173 Kate Wall and Elaine Hall, “Teachers as Metacognitive Role Models” (2016) 39(4) European Journal of 
Teacher Education 403.
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barriers to exploring and testing this hypothesis: for while the creative task, with 
the requirements of complexity, fl exibility and granularity would be daunting, the 
practical task of communicating (to students and clinical colleagues), delivering 
and assessing it would be a Herculean endeavour.174
Nevertheless, there is a strong belief, perhaps subjective or part of an epistemic 
system but still pervasive within the clinical education community, that clinic 
does have that effect on students’ knowledge, skills and values. In developing this 
article, we have had to consider that the absence of evidence is not the same as 
the evidence of absence, at least in the short term. One way to understand this is 
the strength of clinicians’ belief: in most settings, the person who runs the clinic 
has a passionate (if tempestuous) relationship with clinical work. They have 
a commitment to the students and their learning, they love the collegial nature 
of supervision and they recognise the value to the clients of the work offered by 
the clinic. They may also have a particular passion for the clinic’s specialism, 
community or cause. It is likely, therefore, that multiple levels of effect are in play. 
First, the clinician is teaching something immediate, relevant and interesting with 
real pressures and tight deadlines, intensifying the experience and the immediate 
impact on the students. They may not like or understand what is going on (or they 
may enjoy it hugely), but the intensity of the experience is a factor. Second, the 
clinician is a passionate expert and role model, whose impact is likely to be of 
greater magnitude than that of the “standard teacher”: so much so that their data 
might be excluded from a standard meta-analysis.175 There is another, fi nal level, 
which brings together the Hawthorne effect and the power of belief. The students 
are made aware that “something special” will happen in clinic, and they obligingly 
— like the factory workers at Hawthorne — produce effects in response to the 
stimulus as they understand it. There is arguably also a twist of the clinician’s self-
concept in the mix, since the clinician’s belief in her effi cacy can be observed to 
have an effect of its own that is more than a “shared delusion”176 and sheds some 
light on the endurance of epistemic system and subjective belief. Clinic might work 
in the way that we think it does, because we think that it does and we create an 
environment in which these effects are anticipated and noted when they occur: 
thus, through a collective operation of confi rmation bias, we can create a clinic 
effect. That is not to say that there is not an objective clinic effect, there just is not 
currently robust enough evidence for it and still less empirical evidence for how 
174 Clinic is already a hard sell in some contexts because of its resource intensive and risky nature, see Dunn, 
“The Taxonomy of Clinics: The Realities and Risks of All Forms of Clinical Legal Education” (n.94). 
Imagine telling your Dean that it needed more time and resource to investigate whether it was doing 
what we had always claimed that it did. It is therefore not at all that surprising that really systematic 
investigations of legal education are incredibly rare: Elaine Hall, “The Use of Evidence in Writing about 
Legal Education” (Association of Law Teachers 2015 Conference Keynote Speech, 2016).
175 Elaine Hall and Steve Higgins, “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria? What Meta-analysis Can 
Tell Us about Effective Educational Innovations and the Teacher Effect” (International Association of 
Cognitive Educational Psychology Conference, Durham University, Durham, 2005).
176 Ben Goldacre, Bad Science (London: Fourth Estate, 2009).
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it might work. Either way, something is probably going on, and clinicians are all 
convinced that this is a good thing. There is, however, a small defi nitional problem.
When considering notions of social justice and values, clinicians are seeking 
to inculcate notions of what is “good” and what is “bad”. Such questions have 
been debated by moral philosophers for thousands of years. This article will not 
provide a detailed analysis of the debate in moral philosophy but merely highlights 
the debate to demonstrate that not everything is black and white. Moral realists 
hold that moral facts are objective facts. Things are good and bad independent 
of us and then we discover morality. Antirealists hold the view that moral facts 
are not out there in the world until we put them there, facts about morality are 
determined by facts about us. Therefore, morality is not something we discover, 
but something we invent.
Normative ethics provide frameworks to assist in determining what is good 
and what is bad. Normative ethics can be split into three branches: virtue ethics, 
deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics focus on the character of the 
individual and with various virtue traits such as compassion and generosity seen 
good and ought to be exhibited. According to the proponents of virtue ethics, 
individuals should exhibit these virtuous traits even if the outcome is seen as “bad”. 
Deontologists concentrate on the act being performed and consider whether that 
act is intrinsically good or bad. Consequentialists argue that we ought to look at 
the outcome and act in a way that brings the best possible outcome for making the 
world a better place. In essence, the end justifi es the means and therefore the act in 
itself does not matter.
Applied ethics is probably the most useful branch of moral philosophy within 
the context of this article as it addresses practical issues faced in life such as abortion, 
distributive justice and famine relief. Abortion is a highly contentious issue with 
some proponents supporting the right to life of the unborn child while others cite 
women’s right to choose. Such a debate is likely to have renewed signifi cance with 
the Republic of Ireland, where abortion is prohibited under the constitution,177 
announcing a referendum on repealing the ban. While some theorists have posited 
that abortion is morally permissible,178 others have contended that aborting a foetus 
is morally wrong on the grounds that killing any person is wrong.179 With regard to 
distributive justice, there is disagreement among theorists as to the morally correct 
approach. Egalitarian theorists such as Rawls allow for inequalities where they 
benefi t the least advantaged in society.180 Libertarians, such as Nozick, disagree 
with Rawls’ “difference principle” and instead espouse “entitlement theory”, 
namely that people have entitlement over things and it is unjust to deprive people of 
177 Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.
178 See Judith Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion” (1971) 1(1) Philosophy & Public Affairs 47; Frances 
Kamm, Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy (New York: OUP, 1992).
179 Don Marquis, “Why Abortion Is Immoral” (1989) 86 Journal of Philosophy 82.
180 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, Revised Edition, 1999).
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those things even for the benefi t of others.181 A Marxist critique of Rawls considers 
the distinction between distribution and production. Wolff highlighted this point, 
quoting Marx: “Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a 
consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The 
latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself.”182 Notions 
of actions which may be considered good or moral as opposed to bad or immoral 
may not always be easily defi ned and will often depend on an individual’s moral 
positioning. Within the context of the law, and therefore clinical legal education, 
we can envisage a tiered approach to moral reasoning. Some concepts, such as the 
holocaust and apartheid, will be considered immoral.
On the next tier down, there will be legal issues which are divisive. Examples 
include issues such as abortion, euthanasia and the confl ict between religious 
freedom and sexual orientation. We are also beginning to develop new issues in 
the world of social media characterised with the naming of alleged perpetrators of 
sexual harassment. While it is a fundamental freedom not to be harassed, assaulted 
or even raped, there is also a fundamental right to the presumption of innocence.183 
In the world of social media, individuals are effectively being found guilty without 
due process and are subjected to penal sanctions such as lost employment.
At a more mundane level, but one which will be experienced in legal clinics 
on a daily basis, clinicians and their students will be faced with individual cases 
questioning the morality of the client or the case. One example would be a landlord 
and tenant dispute where a landlord is seeking possession of the property and thus 
seeking to evict the tenant. I would preface this with the caveat that we are not 
concerned at present with whether the landlord is legally entitled to possession. Is 
it immoral for the clinic to represent the landlord in seeking to recover possession? 
Is it morally permissible to represent the tenant in attempting to retain possession of 
their home? Some legal clinics adopt a policy that they will only represent tenants.
If the landlord is seeking possession because the tenant has complained about 
the condition of the property, or the landlord is merely seeking to increase the 
rent with new tenants, then it is arguable that it is unjust to recover possession of 
the tenant’s home.184 However, if the reason for seeking possession was the anti-
social behaviour of the tenant such as loud noise, harassment of neighbour and even 
criminal activity within the property. The question could legitimately be posed as 
to whether it is still unjust to seek possession of the tenant’s home? A utilitarian (as 
181 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, original work published in 1974).
182 Robert Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of a Theory of Justice (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
183 Article 11 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone charged with a penal offence has 
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has 
all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”; art.6(2) of European Convention on Human Rights states: 
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law.”
184 A libertarian may argue that the house is the property of the landlord, and therefore, it is unjust to deprive 
the landlord of possession.
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a form of consequentialism) perspective suggests that the greatest good is served 
by evicting the individual and therefore benefi ting the wider community.185 From 
a Kantian (as a form of deontology) perspective, it is arguable that a landlord 
has a duty to the wider community to protect them from an anti-social tenant 
(particularly, if the landlord is a Social Landlord). From a virtue ethical position, 
it is arguable that it is courageous to evict an anti-social tenant, particularly one 
involved in criminal activity. Adopting such a pluralistic approach suggests that, 
from a philosophical perspective, it would be morally permissible to evict a tenant.
The world is not black and white, and indeed, there is a signifi cant grey area 
when we consider cases within a clinical setting. Therefore, we must be cautious 
as to the imposition of our own moral perspective on our students. Notions of what 
is just and unjust will often be determined by an individual’s moral positioning. 
Because our students may adopt a different moral position to ourselves does not 
mean they are morally wrong. Therefore, what can we do?
Our role is to provide the students with the framework to critique the world 
in which they live and strive to develop their own moral position. Within the 
professional ethics of a lawyer, there is perhaps one right that means any position 
is morally defensible, regardless of the case and that is the right a fair hearing with 
due process.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
At the core of clinical legal education is the integration of theory and practice, 
a pedagogical method of teaching students how to be lawyers. While this 
incorporates legal skills training, it has also become synonymous with moral 
educational development and the inculcation of a social ethos among students. 
There is a natural symbiotic relationship between clinical legal education, social 
justice and public service. There are indigent people, as well as marginalised and 
unrepresented groups who require assistance from those with legal knowledge 
and skill. The motivations to undertake a clinical programme can be varied.186 
Extrinsically motivated students who possess legal knowledge and skill (some 
more than others) which they may wish to hone their knowledge and skills for 
their future careers. Alternatively, intrinsically motivated students may wish to 
use their skill and knowledge for the benefi t of others. Many students will have 
both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. While the literature generally adopts an 
idealistic perspective as to the relationship between clinical legal education, social 
justice and public service, there is a pragmatic relationship. In essence, the students 
need experience, while some sections of society need assistance. As such, clinic has 
185 There may of course be arguments that you are not resolving the problem, merely moving it.
186 Paul McKeown, “Pro Bono: What’s in It for Law Students? The Students’ Perspective” (2017) 24(2) 
International Journal of Clinical Legal Education 43.
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often taken root in areas where there is a signifi cant need due to poverty or other 
forms of social upheaval.
Unfortunately, the evidence does not exist to warrant grandiose claims as to 
the transformative experience clinical legal education has on students. We have 
been unable to fi nd theoretical models of change that would satisfactorily account 
for the “one semester of clinic changed my world view” response quoted in many 
articles, nor does the neuroscientifi c or psychological literature suggest that such 
radical changes would operate in this way. An individual’s moral development is 
constructed over the course of their lifetime and has numerous infl uential factors. 
It is perhaps naive to suggest that a clinical experience will shatter their whole 
moral matrix, but this is the kind of validation that clinical teachers have sought 
from their students, and perhaps unsurprisingly, students who have had a positive 
learning experience have framed it as transformational. Much more fi nely grained 
analysis of student experience and identity is needed before the transformational 
nature of clinic is clearly identifi ed and understood. Until then, we need to be more 
conservative in our claims.
A realistic expectation is perhaps that the clinical experience will infl uence 
the student through exposure to new experiences and at least provide them with 
the framework to critically examine the world in which they live. As illustrated 
above, concepts of justice, right and wrong, good and bad are complicated and 
perhaps in many cases a mirage. Adopting a pluralistic approach, there is no one 
“good”. Students must learn how to navigate the sociolegal system, develop moral 
reasoning and determine the “good” which they seek to achieve.
If a clinician seeks to impose their own beliefs on a student, the student will 
not have learnt how to critically evaluate a moral dilemma. The clinician is merely 
substituting one belief system for another. This may be particularly dangerous 
in assessed legal clinics where students believe that they must tell their clinical 
supervisor what they believe they want to hear. As Barnhizer suggested, clinicians 
must be prepared to have the legitimacy of their own beliefs called into question, 
thus enabling the exploration of competing interests and concepts of justice.187 In 
adopting such an approach, we inculcate in our students the ability to think rather 
than what to think.
“It is not the place of [clinicians] to prescribe what [students] ought to 
consider virtuous. But surely [clinics] should do whatever they can to 
prepare their students to arrive at thoughtful judgments of their own.”188
187 See Barnhizer, “The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education” (n.3) p.111.
188 Derek Bok, Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much Students Learn and Why They 
Should Be Learning More (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) p.150.
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